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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------CLUB STANYON STREET, a Utah
non-profit membership
corporation,
Petitioner,
Case No. 16384

-~

UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL
COMMISSION,
Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Petitioner, a private liquor club, asks this court
to review a Utah Liquor Control Commission order suspending
the club's liquor license for one week.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE UTAH
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION
Subsequent to a hearing before the Utah Liquor Control
Corrunission, the Commission adopted findings of a violation of
Section 16-6-13.1(9), Utah Code Annotated,

(unlawful sale to

a non-member) and of a violation of Rule A96-0l-5:6.a.,

of a club facility by a non-member).

(use

The Commission assessed

a penalty suspending the club's liquor license for one week.
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT
Respondent, Utah Liquor Control Commission requests
this court to uphold the Commission's Findings and Order of
March 7, 1979, which suspends the club's liquor license for
a one week period.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner Club Stanyon Street (hereinafter referred
to as "Stanyon Street" and "club") is a non-profit corporation
organized as a private club under Article I of Title 16, Utah
Code Annotated,

(Private Club Act) for the purpose of operating

a liquor locker club for the benefit of its members.

Club

Stanyon Street is licensed by the Utah Liquor Control Commission with authority to store, serve, consume and sell
liquor.
Pursuant to due notice of violations of the Utah
Liquor laws and regulations, a hearing was held on March 7,
1979.

Testimony was elicited from an agent of the State

Liquor Law Enforcement Division that on November 14 and 22,
1978, the agent entered the club's liquor consumption area
and ordered and paid for two drinks (Transcript of March 7,
1979, hearing at pp. 16 and 23).

At the hearing the club

was represented by its corporate officer and by counsel.
The hearing was conducted before four members of the Utah
Liquor Control Commission.
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After consideration of the facts, circumstances and
testimony at the hearing of the matter, the Commission found
that there were two violations, a sale to a non-member in
violation of Section 16-6-13.1(9), Utah Code Annotated, and
an unauthorized use of the club premises by a non-member
contrary to Rule A96-01-5:6.a., Utah Liquor Control Commission
Regulations.

(Transcript of March 7, 1979, hearing at p. 71).

The Commission then ordered that the club's liquor license be
suspended for one week.
The club now petitions for a review of that order
of suspension.
ARGU!>IBNT
POINT I
THE RIGHT OF A LIQUOR CLUB LICENSED BY
THE STATE TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES WAS NOT VIOLATED BY AN OFFICER
OBTAINING LIQUOR DURING REGULAR HOURS.
Petitioner Club Stanyon Street (herein referred to
as "Stanyon Street" and "club") as a private liquor club holds
a corporate charter and liquor

license in the State of Utah.

Stanyon Street claims it has a constitutional right to be
:ree from warrantless searches which was violated by officers
entering the club and obtaining liquor in an unlawful sale
to them as non-members.

The club does not deny the sale or

cSK for suppression of the evidence, or that the violation
be

overturned, but simply states that the conduct of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

officers violated a right.
The club relies heavily on the Third District Court
Memorandum Opinion of Judge Christine M. Durham in the case
of V-1 Oil Company, et al. v. Salt Lake City, C-79-75,
February 8, 1979.

That case dealt strictly with issues

arising out of criminal charges in enforcement of food
preparation and health inspection ordinances at a local
service station.

The decision is clearly not applicable

to liquor control as is the case at hand.

The opinion itself

recognizes the distinction:
Most recently, in the 1979 case of Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 98 S.Ct. 1816, the Court
applied its holdings in Camara and See to
inspections authorized by the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970. That opinion
distinguishes a parallel line of cases permitting warrantless searches in certain
industries which "have such a history of
government oversight that no reasonabl~
expectation of privacy could exist for a
proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise." 98 S.Ct., at 1821. Liquor and firearms constitute such industries (See the
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,
397 U.S. 72, 1970, and United States v. Loarn
Anthony Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 1972), and a
recent federal district court decision includes coal mining within that limited class.
See Marshall v. Donofris, No. 78-2667, OSHR,
Nov. 14, 1978, p. 1175, reported in 47 Law
Week 2411.
Defendants here [Salt Lake City]
argue that food preparation is such a heavily
regulated industry, but aside from the base
assertion, no facts or historical review is
offered to show the kind of regulation and
governmental oversight (federal in nature)
found in Colonnade and Biswell, supra.
V-1 Oil Company v. Salt Lake City, C-79-75,
1979, Memorandum Decision by Christine M.
Durham, District Judge (emphasis supplied).
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-Judge Durham's decision reinforces the fact that
liquor is an intensely regulated industry wherein warrantless
searches have much broader use and application that in the
area of health and safety inspections with which she was
dealing.
In addition, the club relies on two cases wherein
city ordiances were successfully challenged.

But those two

cases are clearly different on both the facts and the law.
The Vagabond Club and the Joe Wheeler cases dealt
with overly broad city ordinances which purported to allow
police to inspect premises unlimited to time and unlimited to
business area even to the extent of furnishing a key to the
police.

In the Vagabond Club the ordinance was specifically

unconstitutional because of its provisions, one of which
would "compel the clubs to provide a key to the police .•• ".
State of Utah v. Salt Lake City, 445 P.2d 691 (1968) at p.
696.

In the subsequent Joe Wheeler case the ordinance went

too far because it in effect required" ... the proprietor to
unlock the door at any time from the inside,- all to accomplish
llie same objective, - a look-see of all the premises",
Lake City v. Joe Wheeler, 466 P.2d 838, at p. 840.

Salt

These

cases are clearly not applicable to the matter at hand.
However, the fundamental question here is not whether
a warrant was involved, but whether the officers' conduct was
reasonable under the circumstances.

Respondent submits that the
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conduct of the officers in entering the club for the purpose
of detecting violations and ordering a drink does not constitute
a "search".

However, if such conduct on the part of an officer

can possibly be classified as a warrantless search or inspection, respondent submits that the conduct was in fact reasonable
and therefore not in violation of any right:
The constitution only prohibits searches that
are unreasonable, and the unreasonableness of
the search is to be determined from the attendant
circumstances.
State of Utah v. Rocha, 600 P.2d
543 (1979) I a P• 545.
A private club seeking the privilege from the state
to deal in intoxicating liquors cannot expect the same protection regarding warrantless searches that can be expected
by ordinary business because of the state's greater interest
in regulating the use and sale of liquor in order to protect
the public welfare:
There is a great difference in the amount
of police regulation permitted where intoxicating liquor is involved as opposed to the
ordinary business enterprises. The law is
stated 45 Am.Jur.2d, Intoxicating Liquors,
as follows:
.•• The power of a state to regulate
or prohibit the ... possession, sale,
.•. or use of intoxicating liquors is
a matter of universal recognition ....
[Sec. 23. J

* * *
The state has far broader power and
greater latitude to regulate and restrict
the use, distribution, or consumption of
liquor than to regulate or restrict ordinary business, because of the effect of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the former on the health and welfare of
the public.
[Sec. 24.]
Pride Club, Inc. v. State, 481 P.2d 669 (1971)
at p. 670.
The purpose of the constitutional right is to protect
the privacy and security of the individual against unreasonable
intrusion by governmental authority.

But there are exceptions

where a liquor club injects itself voluntarily into the vary
area that must be open to pervasive government scrutiny in
order to protect the welfare of society.

Warrantless inspections

of premises have generally been upheld as reasonable in areas
of special concern to society such as firearms, drugs or
intoxicating liquors.
Certain industries have such a history of
government oversight that no reasonable
expectation of priva~y •.. could exist for
a proprietor over the stock of such an
enterprise.
Liquor and firearms are industries of this type; when a entrepreneur
embarks upon such a business he has voluntarily choosen to subject himself to a
full arsenal of governmental regulation.

* * *
The element that distinguishes these enterprises from ordinary business is a long
tradition of close government supervision,
of which any person who chooses to enter
such a business must already be aware.
"A central difference between those cases
•.. and this one [Barlow's] is that businessmen engaged in such federally licensed
and regulated enterprises accept the burdens
as well as the benefits of their trade;
whereas the petitioner here [Barlow's] was
not engaged in any regulated or licensed
business.
The businessman in a regulated
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industry in effect consents to the restrictions
placed upon him." Almeida - Sanchez v. United
States (citation omitted), Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 56 L.Ed.2d 305, 98 S.Ct.
I8Ib (1979).
Respondent submits that the conduct of the officers
was reasonable in the context of the
law in a closely regulated enterprise.

enforcement of liquor
However, if the

conduct is considered a search at all it was authorized for
any one of several reasons:
First, Utah liquor law expressly authorizes peace
officers

to enter into club rooms or meeting rooms of clubs

in order to determine whether the law is being violated.
All peace officers shall have the right
to enter the club rooms or meeti.ng rooms
of social clubs, recreational or athletic
associations or kindred associations incorporated under the provisions of this
chapter, for the purpose of determining
whether any laws or ordinances are being
violated therein.
Section 16-6-14, Utah
Code Annotated.
Second, at the time the license was granted and prior

Ii

to the entry and sale to the officers, the club gave its expres:
I

written consent for representatives of law

enforcement

agencie,

to enter for inspection purposes and waived its constitutional
rights in connection with such inspections.

See "Consent to

Inspection" by Club Stanyon Street (Appendix A of this brief)·
A waiver of constitutional rights even in criminal
matters is considered to be a valid action where liquor is
concerned:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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... in a number of cases it has been
held that searches for, or seizures of,
intoxicating liquor, or evidence of
violation of the liquor laws, without a
warrant, were justified on the ground
of consent to the search or a waiver of
constitutional rights.
45 Arn.Jur.2d,
Intoxicating Liquors, 470.
Where the public has a special interest in strict
control of liquor, a consent and waiver has been held valid
and reasonable in light of police power of the state to
control alcoholic beverages:
We agree with the Ohio court that
one who applies for and is issued a
permit to sell alcoholic beverages
thereby assents to the reasonable and
lawful conditions imposed by statute
and rule and find that due to the
potentiality of criminal activity in
the liquor business there is no constitutional objection to requiring
consent to a warrantless search as
a prerequisite to the issuance of a
liquor license.
The State of Illinois
could completely prohibit the sale of
liquor, but having instead chosen to
regulate it, any restriction or requirement such as consent to a warrantless
search which is necessary to protect
the public health, safety and morals,
is a reasonable exercise of the police
power of the state. Daley v. Berzanskis,
269 N.E.2d 716 (Ill. 1971) at p. 719.
Cert. Denied, 91 s.ct. 2173.
In the foregoing case, the court concluded that it
was incorrect to supress evidence obtained without a valid
warrant because "Considering the nature of the business we
do not believe that a close scrutiny of the operation of the
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.

business through warrantless searches is unreasonable or
arbitrary."

Daley v. Berzanskis, supra, at p. 718.

Third, consent of the state to monitor compliance
is clearly implicit where the club intends to subject itself
to the strict liquor control laws, incorporates as a private
club

and then applies for and receives a license and posts

a bond as required for the "faithful
state liquor laws.

compliance" of all the

Section 16-6-13.1(1), Utah Code Annotated.

Moreover, upon establishment of a state store the club officer
as vendor of the state store specifically agrees to comply with
the law regarding conduct of the state store and the sale of
liquor, Section 32-1-37, Utah Code Annotated, as applied to
a private club by Section 16-6-13.1(6), Utah Code Annotated.
In sununary of Point I, the law is clear that Club
Stanyon Street has no right to be free from warrantless searches
only to be free from an unreasonable search under the circumstances.
"search".

The conduct of the officers does not amount to a
Nevertheless, what was done was only reasonable

under the circumstances of a liquor business so carefully
licensed and closely regulated in the public interest.
POINT II
A SALE TO A NON-MEMBER IS A VIOLATION
OF UTAH LIQUOR LAWS BY THE CLUB.
The club contends that the liquor laws regarding
sales apply only to persons purchasing liquor and therefore
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the club is relieved from any responsibility for its sales.
Respondent disagrees.

The transfer by the licensee club to

one not a member is the prohibited conduct whether called a
"sale" or a "purchase".

The applicable law is set forth as

follows:
No person other than a member or guest who
holds a valid guest card issued pursuant
to subsection 16-6-13.7(13) may make any
purchase from a state store located on the
premises of a social club, recreational,
athletic, or other kindred association.
Section 16-6-13.1(9), Utah Code Annotated.
Stanyon Street's contention would warp this law to
excuse the club from any responsibility for an unlawful sale.
Respondent submits that the purpose of the law is to make a
purchase from a club by a non-member
for an unlawful sale.

a

violation by the club

The transfer by the club is not authorized,

and it is therefore unlawful for both the club and the purchaser.
The rule is found in the list of restrictions clearly
applying to the operation by a licensee of a private club.
Section 16-6-13.l, Utah Code Annotated.

Specifically, the

license and bond under which the club conducts its operation
are:
... conditioned upon the faithful compliance
by the non-profit corporation, its officers,
agents, and employees with the provisions
of this chapter and the Utah Liquor Control
Act of 1969 ....
Section 16-6-13.l(l), Utah
Code Annotated.
Also, the law regarding the responsibilities of vendors
cf state stores is clear.

Where a state store is established
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in a club, the club itself or an officer or employee of the
club

is the vendor and is subject to bonding for compliance

under the Liquor Control Act, Section 16-6-13.1(6), Utah Code
Annotated.

This means that the club itself as vendor
... shall be responsible for the carrying
out of the act and the regulations, so
far as they relate to the conduct of such
store and the sale of liquor thereat ....
Section 32-1-37, Utah Code Annotated.
Moreover, the club as vendor only " ... may sell to any

person such liquor as that person is entitled to purchase in
conformity with the provisions of this act and the regulations
•

• •

"

I

Section 32-1-39, Utah Code Annotated.
Moreover, it is unlawful for anyone to sell liquor

except as authorized by law, Section 32-7-1, Utah Code Annotatec,
and the law especially emphasizes that vendors or their employees
cannot sell liquor in any way not expressly authorized by law:
No person authorized to sell liquor in
accordance with the provisions of this act,
and no clerk, employee or agent of such
person shall sell or furnish liquor in any
other place or at any other time or otherwise than as authorized by this act.
Section
32-7-4, Utah Code Annotated.
Clearly, taking the liquor law a a whole, with its inter-relate: i
provisions, the responsibility is dir~ctly upon the club or its
officer or employee as the vendor to supervise and restrict
the sale of liquor to those sales which are lawful.

The club

as liquor licensee must be held responsible for a violation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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To summarize Point II, in light of the clear purpose
and intent of the law, allowing an unauthorized purchase is a
violation by a licensee.

Specifically, a licensee selling a

drink to (allowing a purchase by) a person other than a member
or a guest clearly violates Section 16-6-13.1(9), Utah Code
Annotated, for the purposes of an administrative hearing to
determine whether a license should be suspended or revoked.
Otherwise, if the club has no responsibility to limit
its sales to authorized members and guests only, then sales
will be made to anyone, and there would be no effective way
to enforce the law.

such a free and open flow of liquor would

totally destroy the concept of a private liquor club, a consequence clearly not contemplated by the strict provisions of
the Utah liquor laws.
POINT III
THE UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION HAS
AUTHORITY TO REGULATE AND PROHIBIT UNAUTHORIZED USE OF THE PRIVATE LIQUOR
CLUB PREMISES.
Stanyon Street questions the Utah Liquor Control
Commission's authority to promulgate paragraph 6.a. of Rule
5, Utah Liquor Comission Regulations:
No person shall be granted the use of the
premises of a locker club except members,
guests and visitors.
It is noted that the club does not contest the fact
that the club allowed use for a sale to a non-member contrary
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the above rule.

The claim is simply that "the Commission

has no authority to regulate the activity it seeks to control".
(Club's brief at page 14).

In other words, the Commission

has no power to prohibit persons who are not members, guests
or visitors from use of the club premises for purposes of
buying,storing and consuming liquor.
Respondent submits that the Commission has full
authority under the law to prohibit the use of licensed premises
by unauthorized persons.

The law is very clear as to just what

a "premises" is:
"Premises" means any room enclosure,
building, or structure where alcoholic
beverages may be lawfully manufactured,
stored, sold, or consumed, and also includes those areas within the boundary
of the private locker club.
Rule A960l-l :2. s.
This definition is consistent wit.h the statutory
definition of "premises", Section 32-1-3, Utah Code Annotated,
as incorporated into the Private Club Act, Section 16-6-12.1
(1), Utah Code Annotated.

The use of the premises for purposes

of storing, consuming and serving of liquor is unlawful except :
upon permission of the state through a liquor license, Section
16-6-13.1 (4), Utah Code Annotated.

The commission's authority

to license a premises is the authority to prescribe reasonable
conditions for the use of that premises regarding alcoholic
beverages.

Where the club purports to be private, for the

benefit of its own participating members only, a regulation
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limiting the use of the premises to members, guests and visitors
is reasonable in light of the purpose of the law.

If any

person, regardless of authority, can use the club premises,
then the club ceases to be a private club and becomes essentially open to any of the public who may desire access.
The club contends that it should be free to determine
how the premises and facility are to be used so as to permit a
person not a member, guest or visitor to play golf or tennis.
The argument overlooks the fact that the club's premises is
defined by the club itself in its application for permission
to sell, store, serve and consume liquor on a particular
"premises".

The club initally controls the extent of the

premises defined exclusively for private members and voluntarily
subjects that premises to state regulation in the first place.
Allowing free and open usage is directly contrary to
the legislative intent to exclude the general public.

Appli-

cants for membership in a club are prohibited from admittance
to the premises until they have been voted on and approved by
the members of the club, and until seven days after application
for membership, Section 16-6-13.7(2), Utah Code Annotated.
Also, non-member guests may not use the premises unless they
have been duly authorized by a member, Section 16-6-13.7(10),
Utah Code Annotated.

If the law contains such provisions to

prohibit unauthorized persons from

use of the premises, then
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how can the CollUllission lack authority to enforce those provisior
as the club contends?

Respondent submits that the law is clearl

intended. to make the private club actually private, and to

au 0,

use by any person without authority would frustrate that purpose
in the law.
Moreover, the Commission has express power to make a
regulation
••• governing the conduct, management and
equipment of any premises upon which alcoholic beverages may be sold or consumed.
Section 32-1-B(r), Utah Code Annotated.
Respondent submits that when the law is viewed from
the perspective of a private, non-profit club "organized prirnarily for the benefit of its members", Section 16-6-12.1(2),
Utah Code Annotated, a regulation prohibiting the use of the
premises and prohibiting access by persons having no authority
by law or by official club permission is a reasonable exercise
of the Commission's authority.

Otherwise, the club becomes

open to the public and the concept of a private club, devoted
exclusively to the use and benefit of tis members, becomes
meaningless.

Stanyon Street in its argument refers to the

remarks of one of the Commissioners as a basis for alleging
that there exists a Commission policy of non-enforcement of
Rule 5:6.a.

The clubs argument begs the question:

If there

were a policy of non-enforcement by the Commission, then there
would be no violation in this case and no appeal.

Contrary
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to the club's argument, the personal opinion of one Commissioner
alone cannot be taken as a policy set by the whole Commission.
The rule in on the books, it is valid, it was enforced in this
case, a violation was found, and the Commission voted for
suspension.

The rule and the penalty should be upheld.
POINT IV

THE INTENT OF THE LICENSEE TO VIOLATE
THE LIQUOR LAWS IS NOT A NECESSARY
ELEMENT IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE LIQUOR
CONTROL COMMISSION.
A hearing before the Liquor Commission is an administrative proceeding to determine whether the liquor laws have
been violated and which does not require that intent or knowledge be found on the part of the licensee in order to conclude
that there was a violation of the liquor laws or to assess a
suspension or revocation of the license.

The proceedings are

not criminal in nature and the standards of the criminal law
do not apply.

The general rule of law is that:

A liquor license may be revoked for the
making of unlawful sales or other violations
of the liquor laws by employee or agents
of the licensee without the latters knowledge
and contrary to his instructions. Thus, a
liquor license may be revoked where employees
of the licensee solicit patrons to buy them
drinks, or permit others to do so, in violation of the liquor laws, even though such
acts of solicitation are done without the
knowledge of the licensee.
45 Arn.Jur.2d,
Intoxicating Liquors, Section 188.
The club does not deny the sale of liquor but attempts
to explain the sales away in that "Each of the alleged incidents
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occurred because of simple human error or oversight".
brief, p. 18).

(Club's

The licensee is responsible for that oversight.

There was in fact a violation even though the licensee may
not have had knowledge of that violation.

Surely the question

of intent is a material issue to an individual defending a
criminal charge which might result in incarceration; but here
we are not dealing with the criminal law or a defendant but
rather with a licensee and a potential revocation of his
privilege to deal with liquor.
licensee is not an essential

In this area the intent of the
element nor is lack of intent

clearly designated in the law as an absolute defense.

The

true question is whether the record supports the findings of
a violation and the order of suspension.

The record is clear

and the order should be upheld.
POINT V
THE COMMISSION'S PROCEDURE FOR NOTICE AND
HEARING DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS OF LAW;
THE CLUB IS NOT ENTITLED TO FULL CIVIL DISCOVERY NOR TO A PRE-HEARING VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS.
Due process for an administrative hearing requires
that a licensee be given notice of the allegations of the
violation and an opportunity to be heard on those allegations
at a fair hearing and an opportunity to be represented by
counsel at the time of the hearing.

These requirements were

fulfilled in this case as is adequately demonstrated by the
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I

record.

Thus, the club's right to due process before the

administrative body was protected within the law.
Contrary to the club's argument, the requirement of
the Commission's regulations is not for discovery but simpiy
for a notice in clear language which adequately describes the
act& of the licensee in violation of the law:
If the hearing is directed towards a
respondent, [the Commission] shall serve
on the respondent an order to show cause
or other notice or order suitable to the
purposes of the hearrng-which shall set
forth in ordinary and concise language
the acts or omissions with which the
respondent is charged or the issues to be
determined at the hearing, to the end
that the respondent will be able to prepare his or its defense.
Utah Liquor
Control Commission Rules of Procedures,
Rule 8 (1) (a). (Emphasis supplied.)
It is the language of the "notice" which must be
clear.

There is no requirement for general open discovery,

as the club implies, to prepare a defense (Club's brief, p.22).
The club claims a right to a visual inspection of
agents and to Answers to Interrogatories.

However, the club's

brief cites no authority for such a proposition, and indeed
there is no authority because there is no right of discovery in
administrative hearings unless that right is established by
some legislative or regulatory authority.

Any discovery allowed

in proceedings before the Liquor Control Commission is limited
to the taking of depositions, Rule 8(14) (a), Utah Liquor Control
Co11U11ission Rules of Procedure, which were not asked for.

-19-
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Due process does require that certain fundamental
procedures be available to a licensee.
cedures

~ere

Those required pro-

in fact satisfied in this case by the notice and

hearing where Stanyon Street had ample opportunity to get and
give appropriate information before the Liquor Commission by
testimony and cross-examination.
quired.

More than this is not re-

Pride Club v. Miller, 572 P.2d 385 (1977).

Nowhere

has due process ever included a right to a pre-hearing "visual
inspection" of the liquor law enforcement officers simply for
the convenience of the club.

Not even in a prosecution pursuant

to the more exacting standards of criminal procedure would a
defendant have such a right, much less a licensee involved in
an administrative hearing which results in suspension or revocation of a license.
CONCLUSION
It is generally recognized in liquor matters that
the State has direct authority to protect the welfare of its
citizens in its own wisdom by licensed privilege or even by

r

absolute prohibition if desired.

p

United States Constitution
Amendment XXI

p;

Section 1.
The 18th article of amendment to the constitution of the United
States is hereby repealed.

pi

e:x

Section 2.
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory or possession

Th

in
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of the United States for delivery or
use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited.
Section 3.

[omitted].

The 21st Amendment did more than merely repeal the
18th Amendment.

The 21st Amendment allowed to the states the

exclusive control of liquor subject only to overriding national
concerns and constitutional protections:
Section 2 constitutionalized an exception
to the normal operation of the commerce
clause [citation omitted].
[Section 2]
is unique in the constitutional scheme in
that it represents the only express grant
of power to the states thereby creating
a fundamental restructuring of the constitutional scheme as it relates to one
product - intoxicating liquors.
Castlewood International Corporation v. Simon,
596 F.2d 638, (5th Cir. 1979) at p. 642.
With that grant of power Utah has chosen to extend
the privilege of possessing, selling and consuming liquor by
license while maintaining strict control over the storage,
serving, consumption and sale of liquor subject only to the
requirements of a constitutional and reasonable regulatory
procedure.
In the matter before the Court, the rights of the
private club, Stanyon Street, were adequately protected.

The

privilege to deal with liquor was requested by the club and
extended by a state license.

Violations in fact did occur.

The club was given notice of the violations and evidence was
introduced at a hearing where the club had ample opportunity
-21-
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to ask questions of the witnesses and introduce its own testimony.

A violation of the law was found and a penalty was

assessed.

A correct and fair course of proceedings was followec

which resulted in a moderate suspension of the club's liquor
license for one week.
If any of the club's business or operation was restricted at all, it was because of the nature of the chosen
business.

Club Stanyon Street voluntarily subjected itself to

a stricter control and scrutiny than any ordinary business by
its own free entry into the private liquor club business.
Merely because the enforcement officers' conduct was undercover,
or because their identity was not revealed before the hearing,
or because the club's officers had no knowledge of the violatior.
at the time it occurred

1

does not impair any of the club's

constitutional rights regarding

their liquor license.

What

rights the club actually has were not violated by the conduct
of the officers or by the proceedings before the Commission.
The proceedings were fair, and the order was reasonab:,J
At all times the Commission acted within lawful authority and
the record will show that the Commission was not arbitrary or
capricious.

.I

Respondent respectfully asks that this Court upho 1·!

its order for suspension of the club's liquor license for a om
week period.
Respectfully submitted
ROBERT B. H~~SEN
Attorney General
JOHN S. McALLISTER
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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CONSENT TO INSPECTION

APPENDIX A

The undersigned, a non-profit corporation of the State of Utah,
having applied to the Utah Liquor Control Colll!llission for a license to
maintain club premises upon which liquor is or will be stored or consumed
as provided in the Liquor Control Act of 1969 and the provisions of Chapter
6, Title 16, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, does hereby voluntarily consent arid
agree that representatives of the Commission, the Citizens council, the Liquor
Division and law enforcement agencies·may and shall be admitted irmnediately
to the club house and permitted without hindrance or delay to inspect completely
the entire club house, club quarters, all books and records of said corporation
and any locker therein while the club is open for the transaction of business
to its members, or while members or guests are present.
The foregoing consent by the undersigned shall become. effective as of
July 13, 1969, and shall not be withdra~m while the undersigned is licensed
by the cormnission to operate as a liquor Locker Club or while an application·
for such license is pending. The undersigned agrees that it will not object
to the.use of. evidence obtained pursuant to his consent, whether at a c01llllli.ssion
hearing or in civil or criminal proceedings before the courts or otherwise, when
used in connection with the enforcement of·the liquor laws of the State of Utah,
it being understood that the undersigned hereby voluntarily waives whatever
·
constitutional rights it may have had or might have in the future in connection
with the foregoing.
Dated this _ _ _ _i_s_____day of __o_c_t_._ _ _ _19--2:__.
Club Stanyon Street
Non-profit corporation

Attest

"---secr-e.tiiry /

I'

/

/

STl.TE OF UTAH
COt~n·y

OF _ __,S'"-'a:..:l::..;to.....:L,,,a,,,k'"'e""------

personally
On the ____1_s_t_h_ _ _~day of ___o_c_t_ob_e_r_~l9 71
appeared before me Donald B. McGivney
and __J_o_J_u_l_i_a_n_o___________
who each being duly s~orn did say, each for himself, that he the said
Donald B. McGi vney
is ffi@'_·_a_T_r_u_s_t_e_e_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ( off ice r)
and he the said

Jo Juliano

is the secretary of Club Stanyon Street
(corporation) and that said officers know and
-cn-d~e-r_s_t_a_n_d_t_h_e
__s_t_a_t_e_m_e_n_t_s_m_a-.d-e--;-h-e_r_e-.i~n-and that their execution thereof is done
voluntarily and without coercion of any kind and is done by authorization of the
Board of Directors (Trustees) of said corporation and that said officers acknowledgec
to me that the corporation executed the same .
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copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent, postage prepaid,
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Petitioner, at 261 East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84111, on this the 28th day of March, 1980.
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